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Abstract 
This paper deals with the erosion of the personal income tax (PIT) base, a well-
known phenomenon that is undermining the redistributive features of the Italian tax 
system. Several sources of income previously subject to progressive marginal tax 
rates are now taxed under substitute proportional tax regimes or are entirely exempt 
from taxation. The existing tax system as of the 2019 tax year is compared with 
three alternative policy scenarios. First, a comprehensive income tax scheme where 
all income components are included in the PIT base is examined. Second, a flat-
rate personal income tax scheme with a drastic reduction in revenue is considered. 
Third, a further flat-rate tax scheme with a neutral effect on revenue is simulated. 
The focus of the comparison is on the unequal tax treatment of close equals. 
Decomposition approaches to the study of classical horizontal inequity are applied 
and discussed (van de Ven et al., 2001; Duclos et al., 2003; Urban and Lambert, 
2008). The findings show that the erosion of the PIT base has increased the level of 
horizontal inequity of the tax system only negligibly, and that limited benefits 
would be obtained if a flat personal income tax were to be adopted.      
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1. Introduction  
 
In the debate about the distinguishing characteristics of the Italian tax system, the 
erosion of the personal income tax (PIT) base has been widely examined (MEF, 
2008; Bises and Scialà, 2014; Stevanato, 2017; Boscolo, 2019a). The gradual 
exclusion from progressive taxation of various sources of income can be traced 
back to the introduction of Italian PIT, known as the Imposta sul reddito delle 
persone fisiche. The original provisions of the reform sought to create a PIT scheme 
with a broad comprehensive tax base (Paladini, 2014). However, once the reform 
became effective in 1974, it became clear that the scheme deviated from the 
theoretical framework intended. Capital income and gains, that were initially 
intended to be included in the PIT base and taxed at progressive marginal tax rates, 
were excluded and subject to proportional withholding taxes. This first exception 
may be seen what we could call the theoretical erosion of the PIT base. A further 
exclusion was allowed in 1987, with the cadastral value of the main residence 
deemed to constitute taxable income only if its value was greater than an amount 
equivalent to 1,300 euros1 and the taxable amount was based on the value in excess 
of that limit.2 Over the last twenty years there has been a marked tendency to 
transfer specific sources of income previously subject to progressive taxation to 
more favourable tax regimes. Without claiming to be exhaustive and based on the 
order of the introduction of the various measures, the following is a list of sources 
of income that have been subject to this phenomenon, which we can define as 
effective erosion. The 2019 Italian tax system is characterised by the following 
features.  
 
i) A substitute tax regime is applied to income from self-employment – known as 
the ‘regime forfetario’ – conditional on certain monetary and organisational 
criteria that tend to restrict the potential beneficiaries to small firms (IRA, 2019). 
The maximum sales volume to be able to benefit from the regime is 65,000 
euros, and taxable income is calculated by reducing earnings first using a cost 
coefficient, that differs by business sector, and then subtracting social security 
contributions; the tax liability is calculated by applying a proportional tax rate 
of 15%.3  
 
ii) Productivity bonuses paid to private-sector employees up to a limit of 3,000 
euros are taxed at a rate of 10%.  
 
iii) Company welfare schemes are entirely tax-free, with a view to increasing 
employee well-being through the provision of goods and services.  
 
iv) A proportional tax is applied to rental income from residential properties, known 
as the ‘cedolare secca’, with two different tax rates depending on the type of 
 
1
 Italian lire converted into present-day euro value. 
2
 Since the 2002 tax year, the cadastral value of the main residence has been one of the 
income sources in PIT gross income, but its value is entirely subtracted by means of a 
deduction. 
3
 In the case of taxpayers meeting certain requirements – that the business was not carried 
on during the previous three years or was not the continuation of an activity previously 
carried on in the form of salaried employment – the tax rate is reduced to 5% for the first 
five business years.  
3 
rental agreement between the parties (10% for controlled rents or 21% 
otherwise). Starting from the 2019 tax year, a substitute proportional tax can also 
be applied to rental income from shops (at a rate of 21%).  
 
v) Cadastral income from properties at the disposal of the owners and located in a 
different municipality from that of the main residence are excluded from the PIT 
base and not subject to taxation at all.  
  
In the light of the above, it is easy to suspect that the gradual subjection to 
proportional taxation of income sources previously included in the PIT base (and 
thus taxed progressively) could have a significant impact on the two guiding 
principles of a fair tax system. Taxpayers with a different ability to pay are supposed 
to pay different amounts of tax, so that a high-earning taxpayer will pay a higher 
relative amount of tax than a low-earning taxpayer, and taxpayers in similar 
circumstances are supposed to pay the same rates of tax. These are respectively the 
vertical and horizontal equity principles (Kakwani and Lambert, 1998).  
Take the case of two single persons, one of whom is an employee and the other 
is self-employed and so can opt for the more favourable tax regime on self-
employment income. For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that taxable income 
from employment after social insurance contributions is the only income for both 
these individuals and amounts to 50,000 euros a year. Suppose again that personal 
income tax is calculated by simply applying the marginal tax rates applicable in 
2019,4 excluding deductions and tax credits. In this simplified scenario, the 
employee would be liable to an effective tax rate (30.6%) that is twice that of the 
self-employed worker, whose marginal tax rate equals the effective tax rate (15%). 
This example shows the lack of horizontal equity when proportional regimes 
replace the application of the progressive principle to specific income sources. A 
lack of vertical equity would also be evident in the case of an employee earning 
15,000 euros, leading to the absurd situation in which the tax system differentiates 
according to the taxpayers’ ability to pay, but regressively: in this case the effective 
tax rate would be 23%. 
Evidence of the magnitude of the horizontal effect in the Italian income tax 
system has previously been provided by Pellegrino and Vernizzi (2011). Their 
results were dependent on the decomposition methodology and on the choice of the 
optimal bandwidth in which comparable individuals are identified. For the 2006 
(2007) tax year and taking the individual as the unit of analysis, the absolute 
horizontal effect of Urban and Lambert (2008) was estimated to be 0.05% (0.09%) 
of the PIT redistributive effect when the optimal bandwidth is chosen by 
maximising the ratio of the vertical effect to the redistributive effect – the criterion 
adopted by van de Ven et al. (2001). The magnitude of the horizontal effect was 
found to be slightly greater using alternative decomposition methodologies but 
never greater than 0.9% (1.2%) for the 2006 (2007) tax year.  
This paper aims to shed light on the horizontal equity issues associated with the 
gradual exclusion of certain income sources from progressive taxation in Italy. By 
means of microsimulation techniques, the existing tax system in the 2019 tax year 
 
4
 The PIT brackets and relative tax rates are as follows (value in euros): 1) up to 15,000: 
23%; 2) 15,001-28,000: 27%; 3) 28,001-55,000: 38%; 4) 55,001-75,000: 41%; 5) over 
75,000: 43%.  
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(hereinafter EX) is compared with three alternative policy scenarios. First, income 
sources excluded from the PIT base are simulated and then reincluded, defining 
what for the sake of simplicity we can call the comprehensive income tax scheme 
(hereinafter CIT). Second, a flat-rate personal income tax scheme with a drastic 
reduction in revenue is simulated (hereinafter FLAT). Third, a further flat-rate tax 
scheme with a neutral effect on revenue is evaluated (hereinafter NFLAT). This 
microsimulation exercise makes possible not just an assessment of the horizontal 
inequity effects resulting from the effective erosion of the PIT base, but also a 
quantification of how horizontally unfair the existing tax system is when compared 
to a tax system that, ipso facto, should limit inequality between similar taxpayers to 
minimal levels. The comparison between the different tax systems makes use of 
four decomposition methodologies designed for the study of classical horizontal 
inequity (van de Ven et al., 2001; Duclos et al., 2003; Urban and Lambert, 2008), 
where close equal groups are taken as the basis for the measurement. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the data, 
the policy scenarios simulated and the IT-EXEMPT microsimulation model, a static 
microsimulation model for the analysis of exemptions from progressive taxation. 
Section 3 describes the decomposition approaches adopted to measure classical 
horizontal inequity. Section 4 discusses the redistributive features of the Italian tax 
system by focusing on the contribution of PIT components and proportional taxes 
to income redistribution. Section 5 presents the results, with particular emphasis on 
the horizontal effects of the existing tax system and alternative policy scenarios 
simulated. Section 6 focuses on the policy implications arising from the research 
findings. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. IT-EXEMPT: a static microsimulation model for the study of sources of 
income exempt from progressive taxation 
 
The substitution of progressive taxation with proportional tax regimes gives rise to 
a series of difficulties when it comes to their simulation. Tax exemptions are often 
granted to a small number of taxpayers, who may not be properly represented in 
sample survey data. As a result, their precise replication may require the adjustment 
of sample weights to aggregate administrative data. Furthermore, not all the 
information needed for the simulation is collected. In the following, the features of 
IT-EXEMPT are briefly presented. 
The starting point of the analysis is the choice of the data source. The model is 
developed using the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) published 
by the Bank of Italy for the 2016 tax year. Deductions and tax credits are assigned 
to taxpayers before launching the algorithm for the conversion of total income from 
net to gross amounts (Albarea et al., 2015). A hypothetical value of total gross 
income was assigned to all taxpayers, 𝑌𝐻 = (𝑌 − 𝑇)(1 +  0.23), that is the total 
net income collected in SHIW multiplied by a factor that equalises 𝑌𝐻 to the total 
gross income from aggregate tax returns, 𝑌𝐴. In the simulation of the 2016 tax-
benefit system, the algorithm identifies iteratively the value of total gross income 
that makes the simulated value of total net income equal to that in SHIW, (𝑌 − 𝑇)𝑆 = (𝑌 − 𝑇), by adding (subtracting) one income unit to (from) 𝑌𝐻 at the 
end of each round if (𝑌 − 𝑇)𝑆 is higher (lower) than (𝑌 − 𝑇). The procedure 
5 
stops when all taxpayers satisfy the condition or when the difference between (𝑌 − 𝑇)𝑆 and (𝑌 − 𝑇) is minimised (Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2001).  
Before the reweighting procedure, proportional tax regimes and tax-free income 
sources were fully simulated. For the proportional tax on rental income and the 
substitute tax regime for income from self-employment, the group of potential 
taxpayers was first simulated exploiting the information available in SHIW and then 
restricted to match as far as possible the real value in the administrative data. This 
was necessary because the pool of taxpayers under examination turned out to be 
considerably larger than the true value after simulation. A thousand random draws 
for each category of taxpayers divided by macro area were carried out in order to 
choose the best-fitting sub-sample population. The draw that minimises the gap 
between the total number of simulated taxpayers and the external total is the one 
used to select the taxpayers.  
Individual sample weights were reweighted in order to better represent specific 
categories of taxpayers, such as those with income sources exempt from progressive 
taxation, those with tax-free income components, those with tax expenditures, and 
taxpayers ranked by non-decreasing groups of gross income subject to PIT. The 
adjustment made use of the wealth of information at the individual level made 
publicly available by the Italian Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF) in the 
form of aggregate data from tax returns. With the external total of the exact number 
of taxpayers benefitting from one of the many proportional tax regimes, it is 
possible to calculate for the corresponding sample group the exact proportion of the 
taxpaying population. A more detailed explanation of the reweighting procedure 
adopted is given in Pacifico (2014).  
A further step consists in the macroeconomic validation of the model. Total 
values of income components and taxes are compared with the equivalent 
administrative totals in order to estimate the extent to which the simulated tax 
system represents a good approximation of the actual system. For this purpose, 
taxpayers with positive income and total gross income by groups of gross income 
subject to PIT are shown in Figure 1. The simulated totals correspond almost 
perfectly with the true totals except for the wealthiest income group (taxpayers who 
declared more than 300,000 euros), for which total gross income is substantially 
underestimated. This reflects the usual difficulties encountered in studies of top-
income earners when employing sample survey data (Alvaredo and Pisano, 2010). 
The representativeness of the results is also confirmed by the adherence of the PIT 
incidence curve to administrative statistics (see Figure 2).   
Gross income values and expenditure related to tax credits and deductions were 
then adjusted using the Consumer Price Index for the 2019 tax year. The replication 
of the existing tax system for the same year and alternative scenarios represents the 
last step needed. Compared with the 2016 tax year, the simulated tax system for 
2019 is characterised by an extension of the cedolare secca to shops and a 
broadening of the substitute tax regime for income from self-employment. No less 
importantly, a further legislative change extended the retirement income tax credit 
granted to taxpayers over 75 years of age to all retired taxpayers. 
In the following, the simulated policy scenarios are examined. The reference 
distribution common to all the scenarios is gross income subject to PIT or substitute 
tax regimes with the addition of tax-free sources of income previously subject to 
6 
progressive marginal tax rates and the ‘80 euro’ bonus.5 CIT includes in the PIT 
base the list of income components taxed at a proportional rate or entirely tax-free 
under EX (see the list in the introduction, which we referred to as effective erosion), 
while keeping constant the remaining features of the tax system. In contrast, in 
FLAT a tax rate of 15% is applied to gross household income subject to PIT jointly 
with a deduction granted at the level of the household,6 while keeping the 
proportional taxes and tax-free income components as simulated under EX. Once 
PIT liabilities were computed, the average household tax rate was assigned to each 
family member with positive income to determine individual liabilities. The tax 
system represented in FLAT is the initial proposal made by the League party during 
its recent term of office (2018-2019), which is the most radical proposal on personal 
income taxation to be put forward in the Italian scenario. The aim of the simulation 
is not to legitimise the proposed reform, but simply to offer the chance to assess an 
alternative tax system intended to reduce horizontal inequity effects as much as 
possible. Among all flat tax proposals, the one simulated in FLAT is characterised 
by the lowest PIT tax rate, thus minimising the distance from tax rates applied in 
substitute tax regimes and tax-free sources of income (which may be thought of as 
components with a zero tax rate). Finally, NFLAT maintains the same features as 
FLAT except for the tax rate applicable to income subject to the current PIT, set at 
24.8% so as to ensure the same level of revenue simulated in EX.  
 
Figure 1 – Taxpayers and gross income subject to PIT by income group for the 2016 tax 
year: values on the horizontal axis in thousands of euros 
 
 
 
5
 A sum of 80 euros per month granted to employees with income from employment 
ranging from 8,174 to 26,600 euros and positive net PIT. 
6
 To determine the amount of the deduction, a value of 3,000 euros was assigned to all 
family members if gross household income is less than 35,000 euros; with household 
income ranging between 35,000 and 50,000 euros, a value of 3,000 euros was granted for 
each dependent member; for income higher than 50,000 euros, the deduction was set to 
zero. 
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Figure 2 – Average PIT rate by income group for the 2016 tax year: values on the 
horizontal axis in thousands of euros 
 
 
3. The measurement of horizontal inequity7  
 
For the classicist, in the sense intended by Dardadoni and Lambert (2001), to 
distinguish between practitioners and researchers making use of tools for the 
investigation of horizontal inequity other than copula functions, the two 
measurement concepts in the literature on the subject – the reranking approach on 
the one hand and the classical horizontal inequity approach on the other – are 
somehow bonded together. Let the pre-tax income vector be 𝑥 =  {2, 5, 5, 7} and 
the resulting post-tax income vector be 𝑦 =  {1, 3, 6, 5}. In this simple example, the 
existence of unequal treatment of equals signals the manifestation of reranking, a 
finding which is quite common in empirical studies with large samples. The couple 
of exact equals ends up showing a different level of post-tax income, which as a 
result leads to the reordering of units, since the third unit in 𝑥 has a higher 
disposable income than the fourth one after state intervention. However, reranking 
can also be the result of unequal treatment of unequals, as the unequal treatment of 
equals can lead to no reranking when those below and those above do not overlap 
with the pre-tax equal units. A further conceptual link between classical horizontal 
inequity and reranking might be revealed by breaking down the overall process of 
redistribution in each of the tax instruments contributing to it, when pre-tax unequal 
units become equal following the payment of an initial tax and then turn out to be 
treated unequally because of the application of another tax.      
Horizontal inequity in taxation was first operationalised in the literature through 
utility reranking. Several authors have suggested such an approach because of the 
inherent difficulties in identifying exact equals in sample survey data (Feldstein, 
1976; Atkinson, 1980; Plotnick, 1981; Kakwani, 1984). Due to sample size 
 
7
 Several decomposition approaches for the study of horizontal inequity were applied in 
this study, although they do not represent the entire spectrum of methodologies proposed 
in the literature. In this connection, mention should be made of the use of copula function 
approaches based on the horizontal inequity concept of Dardanoni and Lambert (2001). Bø 
et al. (2012) and Díaz-Caro and Onrubia (2019) provided the first applications of this 
measurement framework.  
8 
limitations, equals are often rare and not well distributed along the income 
distribution. In Figure 3, the number of taxpayers with positive income falling into 
groups of exact equals is given for the 2016 tax year using SHIW data. In addition 
to the scarcity of cases registered, it may be noted that equals tend to be 
concentrated in the left-hand tail of the reference distribution. Among 9,654 income 
levels corresponding to as many groups, only 782 (8.1%) contain more than one 
individual.  
 
Figure 3 – Exact equals in SHIW 2016: values in euros on the horizontal axis  
 
NOTE: No exact equals were found in the sample with gross income greater than 70,310 euros. 
 
As in Kakwani (1984), the net redistributive effect of a tax system can be defined 
as:  
 [1]   𝑅𝐸 = 𝑉𝐸 − 𝑅 = (𝐺𝑌 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌) − (𝐺𝑌−𝑇 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌) 
 
where VE stands for the vertical effect and it is given by the difference between the 
pre-tax Gini index and the concentration index of post-tax income (referred to as 
the Reynolds-Smolensky index), while the horizontal effect, expressed with the R 
of reranking, is equal to the difference between the post-tax Gini index and the 
concentration index.  
This framework was extended in the work of Aronson et al. (1994) shedding 
light on the concept of classical horizontal inequity. By dividing the population into 
groups of exact equals – that is, individuals or households with an identical level of 
gross income – it is argued that RE can be broken down into three aggregates:  
 [2]   𝑅𝐸 = 𝐺𝑌 − 𝐺𝑌−𝑇 = 𝐺𝑌 − (𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑒 + 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑊 + 𝑅𝑌−𝑇𝐴𝑃 )= (𝐺𝑌 − 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑒) − ∑[(𝛼𝑖,𝛽𝑖,𝑌−𝑇) 𝐺𝑖,𝑌−𝑇]𝑘𝑖=1 − 𝑅𝑌−𝑇𝐴𝑃=  𝑉𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿 − 𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿 − 𝑅𝐴𝐽𝐿 
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In our notation, 𝑉𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿 represents the vertical effect of the tax system and can be 
obtained by subtracting the Gini index of post-tax income with average liabilities 
for each i-th group of equals – which is also defined as the between-group 
component of the post-tax Gini index, 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑒 – from the pre-tax Gini index. Then 𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿 captures within-group inequality (𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑊 ), which is understood for present 
purposes as unequal treatment of equals and is given by the sum of the product of 
the population share, the income share and the post-tax Gini index for each i-th 
group. At the same time, 𝑅𝐴𝐽𝐿, the residual that is obtained when breaking down 
post-tax income in the context of exact equals, is identified with the Atkinson-
Plotnik index (𝑅𝑌−𝑇𝐴𝑃 ). Following van de Ven et al. (2001), the decomposition in [2] 
can be adapted to close equal groups: 
 
 [3]   𝑅𝐸 = 𝑉𝐸𝑉𝐶𝐿 − 𝐻𝐸𝑉𝐶𝐿 − 𝑅𝑉𝐶𝐿= (𝐺𝑌𝑒 − 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑒)− (∑[(𝛼𝑖 𝛽𝑖,𝑌−𝑇) 𝐺𝑖,𝑌−𝑇] − ∑[(𝛼𝑖 𝛽𝑖,𝑌) 𝐺𝑖,𝑌]𝑘𝑖=1𝑘𝑖=1 )     − (𝑅𝑌−𝑇𝐴𝑃 − 𝑅𝑌𝐴𝑃) 
 
where 𝐺𝑌𝑒  is the pre-tax Gini index with gross income on average at each i-th group – the between-group component of the pre-tax Gini index. The second term in round 
brackets stands for the within-group components of the pre-tax Gini index as seen 
earlier, and 𝑅𝑌𝐴𝑃 (𝑅𝑌−𝑇𝐴𝑃 ) is the residual that is obtained when breaking down pre-tax 
income (post-tax income). The decomposition in [3] supposes the absence of 
within- and entire-group reranking (𝑅𝑌𝐴𝑃 ≅ 0), which leads to the equality 𝑅𝑉𝐶𝐿 =𝑅𝐴𝐽𝐿.  
A further adaptation of [2] to close equal groups is offered by Urban and Lambert 
(2008). The decomposition that follows differs from [3] except for the reranking 
term (𝑅𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 = 𝑅𝑉𝐶𝐿 = 𝑅𝐴𝐽𝐿):  
 [4]   𝑅𝐸 = 𝑉𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 − 𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 − 𝑅𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿= (𝐺𝑌 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌−𝑇𝑒1→𝑌2) − (𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌−𝑇𝑒1→𝑌−𝑇2 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌−𝑇𝑒1→𝑌2)− 𝑅𝑌−𝑇𝐴𝑃  
 
where 𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌−𝑇𝑒1→𝑌2 is the concentration index of post-tax means ordered first by 
non-decreasing values of post-tax means and then by non-decreasing values of pre-
tax income among taxpayers with the same value of post-tax mean (𝑌 − 𝑇𝑒);  
10 
𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌−𝑇𝑒1→𝑌−𝑇2 is the concentration index of post-tax income ranked by non-
decreasing values of post-tax means and post-tax income.8   
Urban and Lambert go even further, suggesting a new decomposition approach 
for the study of classical horizontal inequity that takes account of all possible 
rerankings:  
 [5]   𝑅𝐸 = 𝑉𝐸𝑈𝐿 − 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 − 𝑅𝑈𝐿 = 𝑉𝐸𝑈𝐿 − 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 − (𝑅𝑌−𝑇𝐴𝑃 + 𝑅𝑊𝐺 + 𝑅𝐸𝐺) == (𝐺𝑌 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2) − (𝐶𝑌,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2)− [(𝐺𝑌−𝑇 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2) + (𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌𝑒1→𝑌−𝑇2 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2)+ (𝐶𝑌,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌𝑒1→𝑌−𝑇2)] 
 
where 𝑅𝑈𝐿, which is equal to the reranking effect as in [1], is made up of three 
components: the reranking of unequals (𝑅𝑌−𝑇𝐴𝑃 ) as in [2], [3] and [4]; the within-
group reranking (𝑅𝑊𝐺) which takes place when individuals are in a different after-
tax position to the before-tax ordering in the specific group’s income distribution; 
and the entire-group reranking (𝑅𝐸𝐺) capturing the reordering of post-tax means.9 
The differences between [4] and [5] can be better grasped by examining the 
formulas below:    
 [6]   𝑉𝐸𝑈𝐿 = 𝑉𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 + 𝑅𝐸𝐺      𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 = 𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 − 𝑅𝑊𝐺 
 
Basically, the vertical effect as proposed in [5] is equal to the vertical effect in 
[4] with the addition of the entire-group reranking, while the horizontal effect in [5] 
can be obtained by subtracting the within-group reranking from the horizontal effect 
in [4]. It is worth mentioning that the horizontal effect in [5] has the drawback of 
often being negative even for small values of the bandwidth, reflecting the scarcity 
of exact equals in our sample. Urban and Lambert justify this by pointing out that 
the concentration curves of 𝐶𝑌,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2 and 𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2 may cancel each other 
out several times, thus leading to small and negative values of 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿. The solution 
they suggest is to break down 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 into two components, the first being the sum 
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 The formula in [4] can also be expressed with the notation of Pellegrino and Vernizzi 
(2011). The vertical effect (𝑉𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿) is given by the difference between the pre-tax Gini 
index (𝐺𝑌) and the sum of the between-group component of the pre-tax Gini index (𝐺𝑌𝑒) 
and the within-group component of the smoothed post-tax Gini index, 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑆𝑊  = ∑ [(𝛼𝑖 𝛽𝑖,𝑌−𝑇𝑠) 𝐺𝑖,𝑌−𝑇𝑠]𝑘𝑖=1 . The term smoothed refers to a post-tax income distribution 
where liabilities are determined by multiplying pre-tax income values by the corresponding 
bandwidth’s average tax rate. Consequently, it diverges from 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑊 . As far as the horizontal 
effect (𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿) is concerned, it can be obtained by substracting 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑆𝑊  from the within-
group component of the post-tax Gini index, 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑊 = ∑ [(𝛼𝑖  𝛽𝑖,𝑌−𝑇) 𝐺𝑖,𝑌−𝑇]𝑘𝑖=1 . 𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 
differs from 𝐻𝑉𝐶𝐿 for using the same weighting for each of its two within-group 
components; furthermore, 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑆𝑊  differs from 𝐺𝑌𝑊 in [3]. 
9
 Still referring to the notation of Pellegrino and Vernizzi (2011), the expressions in [5] are 
as follows: 𝑉𝐸𝑈𝐿 = 𝐺𝑌 − (𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌 + 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑆𝑊 ); 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 = 𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌𝑊 − 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑆𝑊 ; 𝑅𝑌−𝑇𝐴𝑃 = 𝐺𝑌−𝑇 +(𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑒 − 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑊 ); 𝑅𝑊𝐺 = 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑊 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌𝑊 ; 𝑅𝐸𝐺 = 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑒 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌. 
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of all areas with positive values of 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 and the second the sum of all areas with 
negative values of 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿: 
 [7]   𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿−𝑇 = 𝐻𝐸+ + 𝑎𝑏𝑠{𝐻𝐸−}= ∑ ∑ ∑ |(𝑝𝑥[_𝑛−1]𝐿𝑦𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2 − 𝑝𝑥𝐿𝑦[_𝑛−1]𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2 )𝑘𝑦=1𝑚𝑥=1𝑚𝑖=1− (𝑝𝑥[_𝑛−1]𝐿𝑦𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2 − 𝑝𝑥𝐿𝑦[_𝑛−1]𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2 )|𝑖 
 
i indicates the close equal groups into which the gross income distribution is 
divided; p stands for the cumulative values on the horizontal axis of the curve 
created, while L are the cumulative coordinates of the vertical axis. Thus, 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 can 
be turned into a measure of absolute classical horizontal inequity by taking the 
absolute value of negative areas. As Pellegrino and Vernizzi (2011) noted, this 
modified version of 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 does not verify specification in [5].  
The last of the decomposition approaches discussed here is the change-in-
inequality approach as in Duclos et al. (2003). Unlike the previous ones, it 
constitutes a method that combines the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson inequality 
measure. The advantage of this method lies also in the determination of close-equal 
groups by means of non-parametric statistical procedures. This approach has not 
yet found widespread application in practice and, to the best of our knowledge, has 
never been applied to the Italian context. The redistributive effect is decomposed 
into three components as seen above:     
 [8]   𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 = 𝑉𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 − 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 − 𝑅𝐷𝐽𝐴= (𝐼𝑌 − 𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑒 ) − (𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑝 − 𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑒 ) − (𝐼𝑌−𝑇 − 𝐼𝑌_𝑇𝑝 ) 
 
In this case the first bracket stands for the vertical redistributive effect of a tax 
system that causes no reranking (𝑉𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴), with 𝐼𝑌 equal to pre-tax income inequality 
and 𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑒  capturing expected post-tax income inequality; the horizontal effect 
(𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴) is given by the difference between 𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑝 , a measure of post-tax income 
inequality when the pre-tax reranking is preserved, and 𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑒 ; and the reranking 
effect, 𝑅𝐷𝐽𝐴, which can be computed by subtracting 𝐼𝑌_𝑇𝑝  from 𝐼𝑌−𝑇, the post-tax 
income inequality index. In more detail, these inequality measures are based on the 
use of social evaluation functions and rank-dependent weights. Take the case of 𝐼𝑌 
in [9]. The utility of pre-tax income of the i-th individual takes the form of 
Atkinson’s (1970) utility function, where 𝜀 indicates the ethical parameter of 
relative risk aversion. As for the rank-dependent weights (𝑤𝑖𝑌), observations were 
first sorted by pre-tax income levels. 𝑓𝑤𝑖 stands for the frequency (sample) weight 
of the i-th individual, while 𝑣 and 𝑞𝑌,𝑖 are respectively the ethical parameter of 
aversion to rank inequality and the sample estimate of the i-th quantile of the 
cumulative distribution function. It should be noted that when 𝜀 = 0, then 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 =0 by definition. In the case where 𝜀 = 0 and 𝑣 = 2, the decomposition in [8] 
becomes equal to [1]. Finally, considering the denominator in [9], ?̂?(𝑌) is pre-tax 
mean income. An analogous procedure was followed for 𝐼𝑌−𝑇, replacing pre-tax 
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income with post-tax income where necessary and sorting observations by post-tax 
income levels in the weighting.   
 [9]   𝐼𝑌 = 1 − [(1 − 𝜀)(∑ 𝑈(𝑌𝑖) 𝑓𝑤𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑌𝑘𝑖=1 )] 11−𝜀?̂?(𝑌) = 1
− [(1 − 𝜀) (∑ (𝑌𝑖1−𝜀1 − 𝜀)𝑘𝑖=1 𝑓𝑤𝑖 [(∑ 𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 )−1𝑣(1 − 𝑞𝑌,𝑖)𝑣−1])] 11−𝜀(∑ 𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 )−1 ∑ (𝑓𝑤𝑖 𝑌𝑖)𝑚𝑖=1  
 [10]   𝑞𝑌,𝑖 = (∑ 𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 )−1 ∑(𝑓𝑤𝑖 + 𝑓𝑤𝑖−1)𝑚𝑖=1  
 
For the estimate of expected post-income levels (𝑌 − 𝑇𝑒), it is necessary to 
employ curve-fitting methods such as kernel-weighted local polynomial regression 
(Fan and Gijbels, 1996). Note that the computation of 𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑒  makes use of the rank-
dependent weights in [9].  
 [11]   𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑒 = 1 − [(1 − 𝜀)(∑ 𝑈(𝑌 − 𝑇𝑖𝑒) 𝑓𝑤𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑌𝑘𝑖=1 )] 11−𝜀?̂?(𝑌 − 𝑇𝑖𝑒)  
 
Finally, 𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑝  is computed by simply replacing pre-tax income with post-tax 
income in the utility function, but using a modified set of weights (?̅?𝑖𝑌) as described 
by Urban (2013). The use of the original weights in [9] as initially proposed by 
Duclos et al. (2003) would lead to biased estimates of the inequality measure. In 
fact, equal individuals would be weighted differently, although these units have the 
same ranking if ordered by pre-tax income levels. As a result, the new weights are 
obtained by taking the average value of 𝑤𝑖𝑌 by group of equals. 
 [12]   𝐼𝑌−𝑇𝑝 = 1 − [(1 − 𝜀)(∑ 𝑈(𝑌 − 𝑇𝑖) 𝑓𝑤𝑖 ?̅?𝑖𝑌𝑘𝑖=1 )] 11−𝜀?̂?(𝑌 − 𝑇𝑖)  
 
 
4. Empirical description of the Italian tax system as of 2019  
 
In the following, income/revenue aggregates and common measures for the analysis 
of income redistribution and progressivity in each simulated scenario are compared 
and discussed. An in-depth examination is carried out with the aim of understanding 
the determinants of income redistribution under EX. The contribution of each tax 
instrument to redistribution is calculated employing the method used in Onrubia et 
al. (2014) [hereinafter O14], and then compared with contributions that are 
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measured with the method in Kristjánsson (2013) [hereinafter K13]. The two 
decomposition approaches are extensively examined in Appendix A. This allows 
us to describe the redistributive features of the Italian tax system by showing what 
contributes most to the achievement of its actual redistributive effect. All the 
following figures were obtained taking the taxpayer as the unit of analysis.  
 
Table 1 – Redistributive indices and total sample amounts (in million euros) for each 
scenario  
     
INDEX EX CIT FLAT  NFLAT 
     𝐺𝑌: pre-tax Gini index 0.4432 0.4431 0.4432 0.4432 𝐺𝑌−𝑇: post-tax Gini index 0.3914 0.3871 0.4332 0.4263 𝑅𝐸: redistributive effect   0.0517 0.0560 0.0100 0.0168 𝑅𝑆: Reynolds-Smolensky index 0.0525 0.0567 0.0103 0.0179 𝑅: reranking  0.0008 0.0007 0.0003 0.0011 𝐾: Kakwani index (progressivity effect) 0.1988 0.2048 0.0695 0.0678 𝑡: average tax rate 0.2089 0.2168 0.1291 0.2091 𝑡/(1 − 𝑡): average tax rate effect 0.2641 0.2768 0.1482 0.2644 𝐶𝑇: concentration index of taxes 0.6420 0.6480 0.5126 0.5110 𝐶𝑌−𝑇: concentration index of disposable 
income 0.3907 0.3864 0.4329 0.4252 
PIT gross income 844,590 889,265 844,590 844,590 
PIT exemptions 44,675 - 44,675 44,675 
‘80 euro’ bonus* 11,073 10,984 11,073 11,073 
TOTAL GROSS INCOME 900,338 900,249 900,338 900,338 
Progressive taxation (PIT + surtaxes) 182,048 195,158 110,197 182,191 
Proportional taxation 6,059 - 6,059 6,059 
TOTAL REVENUE 188,107 195,158 116,256 188,250 
Observations 11,734 11,734 11,734 11,734 
Taxpayers 40,714,464 40,714,464 40,714,464 40,714,464 
     
*
 The bonus is kept constant in all scenarios except for CIT since gross income subject to PIT determines 
whether individuals receive the bonus and to what extent. This also explains why the pre-tax Gini index in CIT 
differs slightly from the others. 
 
Considering first EX in Table 1, the redistributive effect of the tax system is 
equal to 0.0517, a result that is in line with studies making use of tax returns as the 
base data set (Di Nicola et al., 2015; Di Caro, 2020). Reincluding income 
components that are currently exempt from progressive taxation in the PIT base 
would lead to an increase in the redistributive effect to 0.0560 (8.3%). The 
progressivity effect as measured by the Kakwani index and the average tax rate 
effect would increase by 3.0% and 4.8% respectively. In contrast, the introduction 
of a flat-rate tax scheme with a marked reduction in revenue would drastically 
decrease the redistribution achieved to a value of RE equal to 0.0100 (-80.7%). As 
a result, the progressivity and average tax rate effects would show sharp decreases 
of -65.0% and -43.9% respectively. These results do not vary significantly when 
revenue neutrality is imposed. Such a flat-rate tax scheme would reduce RE to 
0.0168 (-67.5%). The greater redistributive capacity in NFLAT when compared 
with FLAT is mainly driven by an increase in the average tax rate effect (t: 12.91% 
→ t: 20.91%) and only partially determined by a reduction in the progressivity 
effect of the tax system (K: 0.0695 → K: 0.0678).  
The total value of exemptions from progressive taxation is close to 45 billion 
euros (5.0% of total gross income), that was earlier defined as the effective erosion 
of the PIT base. Table 2 in Appendix B provides detailed information on these 
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income components and their distribution among income groups. On the revenue 
side, CIT would be expected to increase revenue by an amount of 7 billion without 
taking into account behavioural responses that might be induced by the new tax 
system. The loss in revenue that would occur if FLAT were applied is equal to 
almost 72 billion, a significant amount that underlines the lack of sustainability of 
such a reform in the Italian context (unless the role of the existing welfare state is 
questioned and severe cuts in public spending are proposed). 
 
Table 3 – RE decomposition using O14 for different degrees of extension of EX 
     
VARIABLE EX (S1) EX (S2) EX (S3) Value in billions %RE %RE %RE 
     
Tax schedules (𝑺) 48.1 46.9 45.5 244.6 
Gross PIT (𝑆1) 43.4 42.3 38.5 221.4 
Regional surtax (𝑆2) 3.5 3.4 3.2 12.5 
Municipal surtax (𝑆3) 1.3 1.3 1.2 4.6 
Proportional tax on rental income from residential 
property (𝑆4) - - 1.8 1.8 
Proportional tax on shops (𝑆5)  - - 0.0 0.1 
Proportional tax on productivity bonuses (𝑆6) - - 0.1 0.2 
Proportional tax on income from self-employment (𝑆7) - - 0.6 4.0 
Tax credits (𝑪) 54.7 52.4 54.7 56.4 
Dependent family members (𝐶1) 5.4 5.2 5.7 11.1 
Income source (𝐶2) 46.3 44.3 46.0 39.9 
Expenses for refurbishment of historic buildings (𝐶3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Energy conservation projects (𝐶4) -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
Rents (𝐶5) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Health-related expenses (𝐶6) 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.7 
Mortgage interest payments (𝐶7) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 
Insurance premiums (𝐶8) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Non-tertiary education expenses (𝐶9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Tertiary education expenses (𝐶10) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Other tax credits (𝐶11) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 
Deductions and exemptions (𝑫) -1.6 2.0 1.3 49.8 
PIT: self-employed social insurance contributions (𝐷1) -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 19.6 
PIT: other deductions (𝐷2) -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 1.8 
PIT: maintenance payments (𝐷3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
PIT: private pension contributions (𝐷4)  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 2.6 
PIT: cadastral income from main residence (𝐷5) 1.2 1.2 1.2 8.9 
80 euro bonus (𝐷6)  - 3.6 3.7 11.1 
Cadastral income from properties left available (𝐷7) - - 0.0 2.1 
Company welfare provisions (𝐷8) - - -0.7 3.2 
Reranking (𝑹) 1.2 1.3 1.5 - 
     
 
In Table 3, the contributions of tax schedules, tax credits, deductions and income 
components exempt from progressivity to income redistribution are computed 
using the method in Onrubia et al. (2014) for different degrees of extension of EX. 
Scenario 1 (S1) focuses merely on PIT components; Scenario 2 (S2) adds the ‘80 
euro’ bonus; finally, Scenario 3 (S3) brings together the PIT components and all 
the sources of income that are excluded from progressive taxation and taxed at a 
proportional tax rate or are entirely tax-free. S1 and S2 are particularly useful for 
validating our results. Despite the differences in the tax year simulated and the base 
data set employed, the distribution of contributions found in S1 is consistent with 
previous findings obtained using the same decomposition approach (Barbetta et al., 
2018; Boscolo, 2019a; Boscolo, 2019b; Di Caro, 2020). Tax credits are the 
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instrument that most determines PIT redistribution (𝐶: 54.7%) followed by tax 
schedules (𝑆: 48.1%), while deductions have a small regressive effect (𝐷: -1.6%).   
Focusing on the various contributions, tax credits granted on the basis of an income 
from work typology determine almost half of the redistributive effect in S1 (𝐶3: 
46.3%). The second highest contribution is given by the PIT tax schedule (𝑆1: 
43.4%). Then come all the remaining tax instruments such as tax credits for 
dependent family members (𝐶1: 5.4%), the regional surtax (𝑆2: 3.5%), tax credits 
for health-related expenses (𝐶6: 2.2%) and so on. Self-employed social insurance 
contributions (𝐷1: -2.2%), private pension contributions (𝐷4: -0.1%) and a range of 
deductions such as social insurance contributions for domestic help, personal care 
services and support for people with disabilities, donations to religious institutions 
and other deductions (𝐷2: -0.5%) are the measures that contribute regressively in 
determining income redistribution by means of deductions, together with tax credits 
for energy conservation projects (𝐶4: -0.1%).   
As for S2, the contribution to income redistribution of the ‘80 euro’ bonus was 
found to be positive (𝐷6: 3.6%), with a sign and magnitude in line with previous 
evidence (Baldini et al., 2015; Boscolo, 2019a; Boscolo, 2019b; Di Caro, 2020).  
The income components excluded from progressive taxation in S3 all have non-
regressive effects, except for company welfare provisions (𝐷8: -0.7%). The 
proportional tax on rental income from residential properties contributes positively 
(𝑆4: 1.8%) as highlighted in Boscolo (2019a; 2019b), where different static models 
and base data sets were employed, but it diverges from the negative effect found by 
Di Caro (2020) on a sample of tax returns. The positive effect found here can be 
better understood by looking at the distribution of income sources by non-
decreasing income groups. Rental income is highly concentrated in the wealthiest 
groups: the richest fifth of taxpayers account for 84.7% of its aggregate value (see 
Appendix B, row ‘𝐼1’ and columns ‘9th’ and ‘10th’). If the number of taxpayers 
paying proportional taxes rises with increasing income values, proportional taxes 
tend to have progressive effects on income inequality when employing O14.  
Proportional taxes on rental income from shops and productivity bonuses present 
a neutral effect on overall redistribution as defined in this study (𝑆5: 0.0%; 𝑆6: 
0.1%), as does cadastral income from properties left available (𝐷7: 0.0%). Finally, 
substitute tax regimes on income from self-employment as in the 2019 tax year have 
a small progressive effect (𝑆7: 0.6%), with a contribution that seems to confirm the 
observations above for 𝑆4. Access to these tax regimes has recently been granted to 
taxpayers with a maximum turnover of 65,000 euros, while the threshold was much 
lower under previous regimes, as it was equal to 30,000 euros up to the 2014 tax 
year (IRA, 2012) and ranged between 25,000 and 50,000 euros from 2015 to 2018 
(IRA, 2016). In fact, their contribution in the 2014 tax year has been found to be 
small and negative (Boscolo, 2019a).  
As often pointed out in the literature, a plethora of methods are available for the 
measurement of progressivity and redistribution (Urban, 2014). The choice of one 
method rather than another may lead to substantially different results. Among those 
meant for the study of specific contributions, an extensive comparison between O14 
and the method put forward in Urban (2014) is described in Boscolo (2019b) 
dealing with the Italian tax-benefit system. The two methods were shown to provide 
similar results. However, the discussion can be further extended by applying K13, 
a method adopted for the study of dual income taxation systems (Kristjánsson, 
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2013). What makes the comparison between O14 and K13 particularly interesting 
is that the results of the latter method can be used to better interpret the positive 
redistributive effect found above for income components excluded from 
progressive taxation. The main difference in their structure is to be found in the tax 
base on which contributions are computed. While O14 defines taxable income as 
the sum of the taxable share of each income source, K13 takes the same number of 
tax bases as the number of income components that make up gross income as the 
basis for the measurement. In fact, the employment of K13 allows for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the average tax rate effects of income 
components.10 As explained in Appendix A, RS in K13 can be divided into two 
components: a direct effect capturing progressivity effects; and an indirect effect 
measuring differences in tax levels between income subject to progressive taxation 
and income taxed at a proportional tax rate or tax-free income. 
The results of the application of K13 are presented in Table 4. First, it is worth 
stressing that each of the income components exempt from progressive taxation 
now shows a negative effect on income redistribution (see column ‘%RE’) except 
for the neutral effect of the proportional tax on rental income from shops, perhaps 
due to its low aggregate value. Substitute tax regimes on income from self-
employment are the tax instrument with the greatest negative contribution (𝑆7: -
2.1%), followed by company welfare provisions (𝐷8: -1.3%), which were also 
found to be regressive using O14, and the proportional tax on rental income from 
residential properties (𝑆4: -0.8%). The remaining exemptions and proportional taxes 
complete the picture, presenting a smaller but still negative effect. As for 
progressive taxation, its overall effect is the only factor responsible for the reduction 
in income inequality (𝑆1-𝑆3-𝑆3: 106.8%), a reduction that would be even higher 
(+6.8%) in the case of the absence of regressive effects and reranking.  
 
Table 4 – RE decomposition using K13 for EX (S3) 
     
VARIABLE Effect Direct Indirect RE %RE 
     
Progressive taxation (𝑆1-𝑆2-𝑆3) 0.05224 0.00302 0.05526 106.8 
Proportional tax on rental income from residential 
property (𝑆4) 0.00001 -0.00041 -0.00040 -0.8 
Proportional tax on rental income from shops (𝑆5) 0 0 0 0 
Proportional tax on productivity bonuses (𝑆6) 0 -0.00019 -0.00019 -0.4 
Tax regimes on income from self-employment (𝑆7) 0.00003 -0.00110 -0.00107 -2.1 
80 euro bonus (𝐷6) 0 -0.00016 -0.00016 -0.3 
Cadastral income from properties left available (𝐷7) 0 -0.00028 -0.00028 -0.5 
Company welfare provisions (𝐷8) 0 -0.00065 -0.00065 -1.3 
Reranking (𝑹) - - 0.00077 1.5 
Redistributive effect (𝑹𝑬) 0.05228 -0.00023 0.05173 100.0 
     
 
Direct effects should not be negative when a proportional tax rate is applied. 𝑆4 
and 𝑆7 both present a small positive direct effect due to their tax schedule, where 
two tax rates are applied instead of one (10% and 21% in 𝑆4; 5% and 15% in 𝑆7). 
 
10
 Correlating the values in billion euros presented in the last column of Table 3 with the 
contributions of income components exempt from progressive taxation (𝑆4, 𝑆5, 𝑆6, 𝑆7, 𝐷6, 𝐷7, 𝐷8) to the redistributive effect, O14’s contributions show a high and positive correlation 
(0.79), contrary to what is true for K13 (-0.07). 
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These positive effects are then nullified by the corresponding indirect effects. Only 
progressive taxation has an indirect effect that contributes positively to determining 
redistribution (𝑆1-𝑆3-𝑆3: 0.00302). Therefore, the negative contributions to overall 
redistribution found for all the other measures must be attributed to the prevalence 
of negative indirect effects. These results are in line with those reported by 
Kristjánsson (2013) on the tax system in Iceland, but no other evidence has yet been 
provided for Italy.  
As a result, the policy implications deriving from a comparison of the two 
decomposition approaches differ significantly. While the employment of K13 
would suggest a reinclusion of certain income components exempt from 
progressive taxation in the PIT base due to their negative impact on income 
inequality reduction, which is true above all for income from self-employment 
subject to substitute tax regimes and rental income from residential properties, 
taking O14 for the study of specific tax-benefit contributions would perhaps imply 
simply reconsidering the role of these components. In this case, despite the 
consensus that redistribution would be better achieved by resubjecting all income 
components to progressive marginal tax rates, the different tax treatment might be 
justified more easily by the need to boost labour supply efforts or tax compliance, 
since their effect on redistribution is small but still positive.   
 
 
5. Horizontal inequity analysis 
 
In this section, the results of the unequal tax treatment of close equals are presented 
and discussed. For each simulated scenario, the decomposition approaches in [3], 
[4] and [5] were applied on simulations with bandwidth varying by one income unit 
within the range 1-3,000 euros (extremes included). Along with this, two criteria 
were employed for the choice of the optimal bandwidth. First, we defined the 
optimal bandwidth as the one with the highest contribution of the vertical effect on 
the redistributive effect following van de Ven et al. (2001):  
 [15]   𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑅𝐸 } 
 
This was implemented for each of the decomposition approaches mentioned 
above on the i-th bandwidth. Then, following Mazurek et al. (2013), the potential 
vertical effect in [5] can be written as follows:   
 [16]   𝑉𝑈𝐿 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐿 + 𝑅𝐸𝐺 − 𝑃𝑉𝑊= (𝐺𝑌𝑒 − 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑒) + (𝐶𝑌,𝑌1→𝑌−𝑇2 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇,𝑌𝑒1→𝑌−𝑇2)− [∑(𝛼𝑖,𝑌−𝑇 − 𝛼𝑖,𝑌 ) 𝐺𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 ] 
 [17]   𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉 = {𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑖 = 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖} 
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where 𝑃𝑉𝑊 is defined as the vertical within group progressivity effect.11 Mazurek et 
al. suggest determining the most convenient bandwidth by minimising the greater 
ratio between 𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑖/𝑉𝑈𝐿 and 𝑅𝐸𝐺/𝑉𝑈𝐿 or, equivalently, by choosing the narrowest 
bandwidth such that 𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑖 = 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖 as in [17], since 𝑃𝑉𝑊𝑖(𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖) generally increases 
(decreases) with increasing values of the bandwidth. If taxation policy is 
implemented such that net income, 𝑌 − 𝑇𝑗, is the result of the application of the 
effective tax schedule, 𝑣(𝑌), together with a random term (𝑢𝑗) capturing the 
deviation from the actual tax schedule and the effective one for the j-th taxpayer as 
in Aronson et al. (1994) and van de Ven (2001), the optimal bandwidth is identified 
when within group deviation averages converge to zero,  meaning that the rank of [(1/𝑁𝑘) ∑ 𝑌 − 𝑇𝑗𝑗∈𝑘 ] converges to that of [(1/𝑁𝑘) ∑ 𝑌𝑗𝑗∈𝑘 ] for the k-th group of 
close equals, and so 𝑅𝐸𝐺  must tend to zero. It should be noted that this criterion can 
be applied solely when using [5]. In cases in which multiple optimal bandwidths 
exist for a specific scenario, the minimum one was selected in line with the 
interpretation that a low bandwidth value better approximates the implications 
stemming from the horizontal equity principle. 
As for the decomposition approach in [8], we pointed out that the determination 
of close equal groups is statistically driven. However, this does not imply that the 
analyst has no control over the selection procedure. Urban (2013) puts forward 
some suggestions regarding the appropriate estimate of expected post-tax income 
levels. The optimal half-bandwidth of the kernel was determined in a manner 
consistent with Urban’s application:  
 [18]   𝑂𝐵𝑈 =  ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛|𝐼𝑌−𝑇,𝑣,𝜀=0𝑝 − 𝐼𝑌−𝑇,𝑣,𝜀=0𝑒 |𝑘𝑣=1  
 
where 𝑣, the parameter of aversion to rank inequality, ranges in the interval [1.0; 
4.0] and increases by 0.1 units. Expected post-tax income levels were computed 
using the third-degree local polynomials and the Epanechnikov kernel function. 
Individuals falling in the extremes (the 1st and the 100th quantile) of the non-
weighted reference distribution under EX were excluded from the analysis 
regardless of the scenario analysed, so as to preserve optimality in the computation.  
The comparison between scenarios was conducted by adopting the optimal 
bandwidth (or half-bandwidth) as in [15], [16] and [18] found for EX according to 
the decomposition approach applied. Since alternative specifications of the tax 
system can lead to different optimal bandwidths (or half-bandwidths), an 
assessment is provided of the criterion that minimises the difference between the 
‘true’ value indices – those obtained by the application of each scenario-specific 
optimal bandwidth – and the ‘approximate’ ones – those resulting from the use of 
the optimal bandwidth for EX.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
 According to Pellegrino and Vernizzi (2011)’s notation: 𝑅𝐸𝐺 = 𝐺𝑌−𝑇𝑒 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑇𝑒,𝑌. 
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5.1. Results  
 
First, it needs to be stressed out that classical horizontal effects play a minor role 
regardless of the decomposition approach employed. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, 
the sign and magnitude of the effect found for the present tax system is in line with 
previous evidence for the Italian context (Pellegrino and Vernizzi, 2011).
Figure 4 – Horizontal effects (𝐻𝐸𝑉𝐶𝐿, 𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿, 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 and 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿−𝑇) for EX 
Figure 5 – Horizontal effects (𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴) and redistributive effects (𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴) for EX 
Horizontal effects grow with increasing values of the bandwidth regardless of 
the decomposition approach adopted except for 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿, which shows a negative 
decreasing trend over the bandwidth adopted confirming what Urban and Lambert 
(2008) pointed out. 
As for 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴, the magnitude of the effect in absolute terms remains essentially 
unchanged over different values of v. On the other hand, when relating horizontal 
effects to overall redistributive effects of the current tax system depicted in Figure 
5 (right-hand side), a direct relationship emerges between relative risk aversion 
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attitudes (ε) and classical horizontal inequality (𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴) regardless of v, the 
parameter of aversion to rank inequality. 
Horizontal effects grow with increasing values of the bandwidth regardless of 
the decomposition approach employed except for 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿, which shows a negative 
decreasing trend over the bandwidth adopted confirming what Urban and Lambert 
(2008) pointed out. 
As for 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴, the magnitude of the effect in absolute terms remains essentially 
unchanged over different values of v. On the other hand, when relating horizontal 
effects to overall redistributive effects of the current tax system depicted in Figure 
5 (left-hand side), a direct relationship emerges between relative risk aversion 
attitudes (ε) and classical horizontal inequality (𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴) regardless of v, the 
parameter of aversion to rank inequality. 
Table 5 shows the optimal bandwidth (or half-bandwidth of kernel) found for 
each of the simulated scenario according to the three criteria employed. The practice 
of imposing the bandwidth value that optimises the formation of close equal groups 
for a specific scenario – in our case the baseline scenario – to other simulated 
(counterfactual) scenarios was previously applied by Mazurek et al. (2013). But 
what seems relevant here is the application of this empirical strategy to half-
bandwidths of kernel, in other words to the decomposition approach of Duclos et 
al. (2003). Despite the specificities of the criteria used in the assessment of the most 
suitable close equal groups, the concept of half-bandwidth of kernel does not differ 
significantly from that of bandwidth. The column headed ‘Max/Min’ presents the 
ratio between the maximum and the minimum bandwidth and serves as a proxy for 
the bias introduced in the calculation of ‘approximate’ horizontal effects. Out of all 
criteria, 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿 is found to be the most accurate only when applied to the 
decomposition approach in [3]. The capability of the criterion to minimise the 
dispersion among optimal bandwidths of dissimilar scenarios is strictly related to 
the framework into which the criterion was first conceived. In fact, 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿 is rather 
inaccurate when applied to the specifications in [4] and [5]. As for 𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉, which 
can be applied solely to the decomposition approach in [5], it provides a greater 
level of accuracy (almost three times greater) than that achievable with 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿. 
Finally, 𝑂𝐵𝑈, which is specific to the decomposition approach in [8], performs 
poorly when compared to the previous application with 𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉. However, it is 
necessary to bear in mind that the specification in [7] leads to an absolute measure 
of horizontal inequity that does not verify equation [5], and that the decomposition 
approach in [3] comes with a number of methodological limitations that have been 
addressed by subsequent methods in the literature – the remaining decompositions 
employed in this study. On the other hand, in the opinion of the author, the 
specification in [8] is the most theory-grounded method for the study of classical 
horizontal inequity out of those considered.  
 
Table 5 – The optimal bandwidth (half-bandwidth of kernel) 
      
CRITERION EX CIT FLAT NFLAT Max/Min 
      𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉 : UL 750 600 336 664 2.23 
       𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿: VCL 1,997 2,013 2,012 2,013 1.01 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿: AJL-UL 280 704 1,347 1,623 5.80 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿: UL 280 336 1,347 1,623 5.80 
       𝑂𝐵𝑈: DJA 1,156 1,302 4,597 4,670 4.04 
      
21 
 
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the decomposition methods. Several 
considerations follow from comparing simulated scenarios. 
 
i) The erosion of the PIT base – the gradual exclusion from progressive taxation of 
income components previously included in the PIT base, for a value of roughly 
45 billion euros in 2019 – shows practically no effect on the horizontal inequity 
features of the tax system. The difference in the level of horizontal inequity 
between EX and CIT – the latter being a counterfactual scenario that subjects to 
progressive taxation those income components currently excluded – is negligible 
regardless of the decomposition approach.12 
 
ii) On the other hand, the erosion of the PIT base has a substantial effect on the 
vertical redistributive features of the tax system. As far as the decompositions in 
[3], [4] and [5] are concerned, the loss of vertical equity attributable to current 
exemptions from progressivity ranges in the interval [-0.004212; -0.004187], 
roughly 8.1% of RE in EX (see approximate value indices in Table 6). This is 
true also when employing the specification in [8], for a loss that ranges in the 
interval [-9.1%; -6.1%] depending on the specific combination of v and ε (see 
approximate value indices in Table 7). 
 
iii) Peculiar to the loss of vertical equity, the erosion of the PIT base has led to a 
rather modest increase in the reranking of unequals. The increase ranges in the 
interval [0.10%-0.11%] of RE in EX according to decompositions in [3], [4] and 
[5], while it is negligible and often nil for the selected combinations of v and ε 
in [8]. 
 
iv) In contrast with the previous comparisons, the introduction of a flat-rate 
personal income tax scheme with a drastic reduction in revenue would lead to a 
minimal gain in terms of horizontal inequity. Its absolute level would be half that 
of the present tax system13 but at the cost of a remarkable increase in income 
inequality by means of a four-fifth reduction in vertical equity. These findings 
are confirmed regardless of the decomposition approach.   
 
v) Finally, the introduction of a flat-rate personal income tax scheme with a neutral 
effect on revenue would not just substantially increase income inequality, but 
would also lead to no gain in terms of horizontal inequity. In fact, the absolute 
level of horizontal inequity would be equal to or greater than the present one 
regardless of the decomposition approach. Unlike the previous case, such a flat 
tax reform would come with greater reranking of unequals than the present level 
and a three-fifth loss in vertical equity.     
 
 
12
 The difference in percentage of RE in EX is equal to: i) 0.02% for 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿−𝑇 with 𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉; 
ii) 0.06% for 𝐻𝐸𝑉𝐶𝐿 with 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿; iii) 0.01% for 𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 with 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿; iv) 0.004% for 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿−𝑇 with 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿; v) zero in the case of 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 with 𝑂𝐵𝑈 regardless of the selected 
combination of v and ε in Table 7. 
13
 The difference in percentage of RE in EX is equal to (or ranges in the interval): i) 0.05% 
for 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿−𝑇 with 𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉; ii) 0.38% for 𝐻𝐸𝑉𝐶𝐿 with 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿; iii) 0.04% for 𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 with 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿; iv) 0.02% for 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿−𝑇 with 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿; v) [0%; 1.74%] for the selected combinations 
of v and ε in the case of 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 with 𝑂𝐵𝑈. 
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6. Discussion and policy implications 
 
The erosion of the PIT base has increased the level of horizontal inequity of the tax 
system only negligibly. What seems to be controversial is that horizontal 
redistributive effects of this phenomenon have been taken, among other reasons, to 
justify the introduction of a flat-rate tax scheme in the Italian system (Stevanato, 
2017). 
As pointed out in the economic literature, progressivity in taxation can be 
achieved in different ways. The compliance of the tax system with the principle of 
progressive taxation could also be accomplished by introducing a flat-rate tax 
scheme. In fact, a proportional tax rate jointly combined with a significant no tax 
area, with further deductions where appropriate, would ensure the progressivity of 
the PIT and of the entire tax system in line with the principles of the Italian 
Constitution. Considering only the progressive nature of the PIT, even a small no 
tax area would ensure its accomplishment. Moving to a flat tax scheme with a 
drastic reduction in revenue would reduce horizontal inequity, while leading to a 
simplification of the tax system, as well as possibly having a positive impact on 
individual labour supply and tax compliance.  
Despite the many issues that still need to be addressed in relation to the taxation 
of personal income (MEF, 2008), the argument that greater horizontal equity would 
result from such a revision of the tax system should be carefully considered in light 
of the marked reduction in the redistributive effect that would follow. This is not to 
say that the erosion of the PIT base is of negligible importance. The deviation from 
the theoretical framework that inspired the structure of the PIT does in fact affect 
the reduction of income inequality: the redistributive effect would increase by 8.3% 
in the case in which income components now subject to proportional taxation were 
reincluded in the PIT base, as this study points out. Furthermore, this increase 
would be 16.8% in the case in which capital income and gains were among the 
income components reincluded (Boscolo, 2019a). On the contrary, moving to a flat 
tax scheme such as those simulated here would dramatically decrease the 
redistributive effect in both cases. More importantly, no substantial gain would be 
achieved in terms of the treatment of close equals in the case in which the 
proportional tax rate were to be set at a low level. In the opinion of the author, this 
gain would not be enough to justify the disproportionate loss in vertical equity that 
would follow. This is partly due to the low existing level of horizontal inequity that 
characterises the Italian tax system. On the other hand, a reform with a neutral effect 
on revenue would lead to equal or greater horizontal inequity compared with the 
current system. However, the introduction of a flat tax that is intended to exploit all 
the benefits mentioned above would need to be carried out by setting the tax rate at 
such a level that would reduce revenue substantially and thus increase income 
inequality compared to the current situation. Even when designing a flat tax so as 
to limit as far as possible the drawbacks relating to greater income inequality, it 
remains to be seen whether it would be effective in terms of boosting individual 
labour supply, reducing tax evasion and achieving greater horizontal equity.  
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper used static microsimulation techniques and decomposition approaches 
for the study of classical horizontal inequity to clarify three points: i) the erosion of 
the PIT base – the gradual exclusion from progressive taxation of income 
components previously included in the PIT base – has a negligible impact on the 
level of horizontal inequity of the tax system; ii) the introduction of a flat-rate 
personal income tax scheme with a drastic reduction in revenue would halve the 
existing level of horizontal inequity at the cost of a four-fifth reduction in vertical 
equity; iii) the introduction of a flat-rate personal income tax scheme with a neutral 
impact on revenue would not reduce the existing level of horizontal inequity, 
despite leading to a three-fifth reduction in vertical equity.     
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Table 6 – RE decomposition using [3], [4] and [5]: indices multiplied by 100  
 
INDEX 
𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉  for EX (approximate value indices except for EX) 𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉  for each scenario (true value indices) 
EX CIT FLAT NFLAT EX CIT FLAT NFLAT 
Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE 
                 𝑉𝐸𝑈𝐿 5.2478 101.44 5.6681 101.20 1.0302 103.24 1.7925 106.53 5.2478 101.44 5.6675 101.19 1.0299 103.21 1.7928 106.54 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 -0.0023 -0.04 -0.0015 -0.03 0.0006 0.06 -0.0004 -0.02 -0.0023 -0.04 -0.0021 -0.04 0.0003 0.03 0.0000 0.00 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿−𝑇 0.0049 0.09 0.0039 0.07 0.0021 0.21 0.0047 0.28 0.0049 0.09 0.0039 0.07 0.0017 0.17 0.0052 0.31 𝑅𝐴𝐽𝐿 0.0528 1.02 0.0474 0.85 0.0178 1.78 0.0783 4.65 0.0528 1.02 0.0494 0.88 0.0236 2.36 0.0805 4.78 𝑅𝑊𝐺 0.0228 0.44 0.0208 0.37 0.0139 1.39 0.0317 1.88 0.0228 0.44 0.0185 0.33 0.0080 0.80 0.0292 1.74 𝑅𝐸𝐺 0.0012 0.02 0.0005 0.01 0 0.00 0.0002 0.01 0.0012 0.02 0.0008 0.01 0.0001 0.01 0.0004 0.02 𝑹𝑬 5.1733 100.00 5.6009 100.00 0.9979 100.00 1.6827 100.00 5.1733 100.00 5.6009 100.00 0.9979 100.00 1.6827 100.00 
                 
INDEX 
𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿  for EX (approximate value indices except for EX) 𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿  for each scenario (true value indices) 
EX CIT FLAT NFLAT EX CIT FLAT NFLAT 
Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE 
 𝑉𝐸𝑉𝐶𝐿 5.2554 101.59 5.6741 101.31 1.0320 103.42 1.7959 106.73 5.2554 101.59 5.6743 101.31 1.0327 103.49 1.8000 106.97 𝐻𝐸𝑉𝐶𝐿 0.0454 0.88 0.0423 0.76 0.0255 2.56 0.0518 3.08 0.0454 0.88 0.0411 0.73 0.0259 2.60 0.0532 3.16 𝑅𝑉𝐶𝐿 0.0367 0.71 0.0309 0.55 0.0086 0.86 0.0614 3.65 0.0367 0.71 0.0323 0.58 0.0089 0.89 0.0641 3.81 
                         𝑉𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 5.2455 101.40 5.6667 101.17 1.0296 103.18 1.7901 106.38 5.2455 101.40 5.6693 101.22 1.0316 103.38 1.7969 106.79 𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 0.0094 0.18 0.0089 0.16 0.0071 0.71 0.0140 0.83 0.0094 0.18 0.0189 0.34 0.0211 2.11 0.0548 3.26 𝑅𝐴𝐽𝐿−𝑈𝐿 0.0628 1.21 0.0569 1.02 0.0246 2.47 0.0934 5.55 0.0628 1.21 0.0495 0.88 0.0126 1.26 0.0594 3.53 
                 𝑉𝐸𝑈𝐿 5.2506 101.49 5.6698 101.23 1.0300 103.22 1.7939 106.61 5.2506 101.49 5.6700 101.23 1.0316 103.38 1.7966 106.77 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿 0.0004 0.01 0.0002 0.00 0.0003 0.03 0.0010 0.06 0.0004 0.01 0.0004 0.01 0.0020 0.20 0.0038 0.23 𝐻𝐸𝑈𝐿−𝑇 0.0025 0.05 0.0023 0.04 0.0015 0.15 0.0029 0.17 0.0025 0.05 0.0023 0.04 0.0037 0.37 0.0062 0.37 𝑅𝐴𝐽𝐿 0.0628 1.21 0.0569 1.02 0.0247 2.48 0.0935 5.56 0.0628 1.21 0.0560 1.00 0.0126 1.26 0.0642 3.82 𝑅𝑊𝐺 0.0090 0.17 0.0087 0.16 0.0067 0.67 0.0129 0.77 0.0090 0.17 0.0101 0.18 0.0191 1.91 0.0458 2.72 𝑅𝐸𝐺 0.0051 0.10 0.0031 0.06 0.0004 0.04 0.0038 0.23 0.0051 0.10 0.0026 0.05 0 0.00 0.0001 0.01 𝑹𝑬 5.1733 100.00 5.6009 100.00 0.9979 100.00 1.6827 100.00 5.1733 100.00 5.6009 100.00 0.9979 100.00 1.6827 100.00 
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Table 7 – RE decomposition using [8] with different combinations of v and ε 
 
INDEX 
𝑂𝐵𝑈 for EX (approximate value indices except for EX) 𝑂𝐵𝑈 for each scenario (true value indices) 
EX CIT FLAT NFLAT EX CIT FLAT NFLAT 
Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE Effect %RE 
                 
 v=1.1 and ε=0.1 v=1.1 and ε=0.1 𝑉𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0142 102.16 0.0152 102.01 0.0032 103.23 0.0055 105.77 0.0142 102.16 0.0152 102.0 0.0032 103.2 0.0055 105.8 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0001 0.72 0.0001 0.67 0.0001 3.23 0.0001 1.92 0.0001 0.72 0.0001 0.7 0.0001 3.2 0.0001 1.9 𝑅𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0002 1.44 0.0002 1.34 0 0 0.0002 3.85 0.0002 1.44 0.0002 1.3 0 0.0 0.0002 3.8 𝑹𝑬𝑫𝑱𝑨 0.0139 100.00 0.0149 100.00 0.0031 100.00 0.0052 100.00 0.0139 100.00 0.0149 100.0 0.0031 100.0 0.0052 100.0 
 v=4.0 and ε=0.1 v=4.0 and ε=0.1 𝑉𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0474 101.94 0.0505 101.61 0.0116 104.50 0.0202 108.60 0.0474 101.94 0.0505 101.6 0.0116 104.5 0.0202 108.6 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0002 0.43 0.0002 0.40 0 0 0.0001 0.54 0.0002 0.43 0.0002 0.4 0 0.0 0.0001 0.5 𝑅𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0007 1.51 0.0006 1.21 0.0005 4.50 0.0015 8.06 0.0007 1.51 0.0006 1.2 0.0005 4.5 0.0015 8.1 𝑹𝑬𝑫𝑱𝑨 0.0465 100.00 0.0497 100 0.0111 100.00 0.0186 100.00 0.0465 100.00 0.0497 100.0 0.0111 100.0 0.0186 100.0 
 v=2.0 and ε=0.5 v=2.0 and ε=0.5 𝑉𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0485 102.54 0.0518 101.97 0.0121 104.31 0.0210 108.81 0.0485 102.54 0.0517 101.8 0.012 103.4 0.0209 108.3 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0005 1.06 0.0005 0.98 0.0002 1.72 0.0008 4.15 0.0005 1.06 0.0004 0.8 0.0001 0.9 0.0007 3.6 𝑅𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0007 1.48 0.0005 0.98 0.0003 2.59 0.0009 4.66 0.0007 1.48 0.0005 1.0 0.0003 2.6 0.0009 4.7 𝑹𝑬𝑫𝑱𝑨 0.0473 100.00 0.0508 100.00 0.0116 100.00 0.0193 100.00 0.0473 100.00 0.0508 100.0 0.0116 100.0 0.0193 100.0 
 v=3.0 and ε=0.5 v=3.0 and ε=0.5 𝑉𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0474 102.38 0.0506 102.22 0.0122 105.17 0.0212 109.28 0.0474 102.38 0.0505 102.0 0.0121 104.3 0.0211 108.8 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0005 1.08 0.0005 1.01 0.0002 1.72 0.0006 3.09 0.0005 1.08 0.0004 0.8 0.0001 0.9 0.0005 2.6 𝑅𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0006 1.30 0.0006 1.21 0.0004 3.45 0.0012 6.19 0.0006 1.30 0.0006 1.2 0.0004 3.4 0.0012 6.2 𝑹𝑬𝑫𝑱𝑨 0.0463 100.00 0.0495 100.00 0.0116 100.00 0.0194 100.00 0.0463 100.00 0.0495 100.0 0.0116 100.0 0.0194 100.0 
 v=1.1 and ε=0.9 v=1.1 and ε=0.9 𝑉𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0423 102.92 0.0450 102.74 0.0117 105.40 0.0202 108.6 0.0423 102.92 0.0448 102.3 0.0115 103.6 0.0199 107.0 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0011 2.68 0.0011 2.51 0.0005 4.50 0.0015 8.06 0.0011 2.68 0.0009 2.1 0.0003 2.7 0.0012 6.5 𝑅𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0001 0.24 0.0001 0.23 0.0001 0.90 0.0001 0.54 0.0001 0.24 0.0001 0.2 0.0001 0.9 0.0001 0.5 𝑹𝑬𝑫𝑱𝑨 0.0411 100.00 0.0438 100.00 0.0111 100.00 0.0186 100.00 0.0411 100.00 0.0438 100.0 0.0111 100.0 0.0186 100.0 
 v=4.0 and ε=0.9 v=4.0 and ε=0.9 𝑉𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0358 103.77 0.0379 103.55 0.0108 106.93 0.0188 110.59 0.0358 103.77 0.0377 103.0 0.0105 104.0 0.0184 108.2 𝐻𝐸𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0010 2.90 0.0010 2.73 0.0004 3.96 0.0011 6.47 0.0010 2.90 0.0008 2.2 0.0001 1.0 0.0007 4.1 𝑅𝐷𝐽𝐴 0.0003 0.87 0.0003 0.82 0.0003 2.97 0.0007 4.12 0.0003 0.87 0.0003 0.8 0.0003 3.0 0.0007 4.1 𝑹𝑬𝑫𝑱𝑨 0.0345 100.00 0.0366 100.00 0.0101 100.00 0.017 100.00 0.0345 100.00 0.0366 100.0 0.0101 100.0 0.017 100.0 
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Appendix A 
 
The decomposition formulas for the Reynolds-Smolensky index applied in Section 
4 are discussed here. It is worth specifying that 𝑉𝐸 in [1] can be thought of as the 
sum of the vertical effect and the classical horizontal effect, as expressed in [5].  
The computation of the contribution made by each instrument was first carried 
out by applying the generalisation of the Pfähler–Lambert decomposition provided 
by Onrubia et al. (2014). Following the order of the terms on the right-hand side of 
[13], the RS index can be broken down into three main aggregates, namely: i) the 
sum of tax schedules; ii) the sum of tax credits; iii) the sum of exemptions, 
allowances and deductions. Each aggregate is given by the sum of its 
subcomponents, while each subcomponent is given by the product of the group 
weight – which is constant for all the subcomponents of a specific aggregate – the 
individual weight and the Kakwani index (the terms within round brackets). Y is the 
gross income, which is the sum of all sources of income either subject to or exempt 
from progressive taxation; B is the total taxable income, given by the sum of the 
taxable income components subject to PIT or substitute taxes; S stands for the 
overall gross liability; T is the total net liability; 𝑆𝑖 indicates the i-th tax schedule; 𝐶𝑖 is the i-th tax credit; and 𝐷𝑖 represents the i-th exemption, allowance or deduction 
in the tax system. An upper bar means that the variable is at its average value.  
 [13]   𝑅𝑆 =  ?̅??̅? − 𝑆̅  ∑ 𝑆?̅??̅?𝑘𝑖=1 (𝐶𝐵,𝑌 − 𝐶𝐵−𝑆𝑖 ,𝑌) −  ?̅??̅? − ?̅?  ∑ 𝐶?̅??̅?𝑚𝑖=1 (𝐶𝑌−𝑆,𝑌 − 𝐶𝑌−𝑆−𝐶𝑖,𝑌)− ?̅?𝑆̅?̅?(?̅? − 𝑆̅) ∑ ?̅?𝑖?̅?𝑛𝑖=1 (𝐺𝑌 − 𝐶𝑌−𝐷𝑖,𝑌) 
 
What if the analysis were conducted by isolating the contribution of each 
instrument on the basis of its own tax base? Would these findings provide a 
substantially different snapshot of what determines redistribution? These questions 
can be addressed by applying the so-called natural decomposition rule as defined 
in Kristjánsson (2013). In contrast to the approach just discussed, the effect of each 
instrument is computed on its corresponding tax base. The method has been adopted 
as a technique for analysing the redistributive effect of a dual income tax system, 
where labour income is subject to progressive marginal tax rates and capital income 
to alternative proportional tax regimes. Since our interest is in understanding the 
role played also by income components exempt from taxation, company welfare 
provisions, cadastral income from properties left available and the ‘80 euro’ bonus 
can be thought of as income sources where a zero tax rate is applied. The 
decomposition formula allows us to separate the RS index into direct and indirect 
effects. As far as direct effects are concerned, the interpretation is straightforward 
as they are defined as the sum of the progressivity effects of all mutually exclusive 
income sources making up total gross income.  
Turning to the indirect effects, they can be interpreted as the result of differences 
in the various tax schedules applied and how income distributions fit one another. 
Therefore: 
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[14]   𝑅𝑆 =  ∑(𝑅𝑆𝑖𝐷 −  𝑅𝑆𝑖𝐼)𝑘𝑖=1  = ∑ [?̅?𝐶𝑖?̅? 𝑡𝐶𝑖1 −  𝑡𝐶𝑖 (𝐶𝑇𝐶𝑖 ,𝑌 − 𝐶𝑌𝐶𝑖 ,𝑌) −  ?̅?𝐶𝑖?̅? (𝑡 −  𝑡𝐶𝑖1 −  𝑡 ) 𝐶𝑌𝐶𝑖−𝑇𝐶𝑖 ,𝑌]𝑘𝑖=1  
 
where 𝑌𝐶𝑖 is the i-th gross income component; Y is the sum of all gross income 
components; 𝑇𝐶𝑖 is the amount of net tax liability due on the i-th gross income 
component; 𝑡𝐶𝑖 stands for the average tax rate of the net tax liability due on the i-th 
gross income component; t is the average tax rate in the tax system as a whole; 𝐶𝑇𝐶𝑖 ,𝑌 is the concentration index of the net tax liability due on the i-th gross income 
component sorted by non-decreasing values of total gross income, and so on for the 
remaining concentration indices. 
 
 
 Appendix B 
 
Legend: 𝐼1, rental income from residential properties subject to proportional taxation;  𝐼2, rental income from shops subject to proportional 
taxation; 𝐼3, self-employment income subject to substitute tax regimes; 𝐼4, productivity bonuses; 𝐼5, cadastral income from properties left 
available; 𝐼6, company welfare provisions; 𝐼7, ‘80 euro’ bonus; 𝐼8, income subject to progressive taxation; 𝐼9, total gross income; 𝑇1, gross 
PIT; 𝑇2, net PIT; 𝑇3, regional surtax; 𝑇4, municipal surtax; 𝑇5, proportional taxes; 𝑇6, total taxes.  
 
Table 2 – Statistics on income and revenue: total values and distribution among income groups  
 
Variable Value Taxpayers 𝑮𝒀 𝑪𝑿,𝒀 Income group (%) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
               𝐼1 10,585 2,038,198 0.9768 0.7824 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.0 3.2 2.0 3.4 4.5 20.5 64.2 𝐼2 276 481,214 0.9933 0.3951 0.7 1.3 0.9 6.3 10.7 3.8 12.2 16.8 7.1 34.0 𝐼3 26,609 1,198,008 0.9805 0.4932 0.1 2.4 1.8 4.4 3.1 4.5 16.1 21.6 19.3 26.6 𝐼4 1,983 1,858,384 0.9605 0.6421 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 2.5 4.6 9.8 19.5 26.2 36.6 𝐼5 2,064 5,641,556 0.9386 0.4629 6.1 7.4 3.1 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.6 10.8 20.5 40.1 𝐼6 3,158 1,802,074 0.9801 0.7027 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.6 4.5 14.5 11.9 11.4 55.7 𝐼7 11,073 12,758,267 0.7154 0.0505 0.8 0.6 4.3 13.3 21.3 25.2 27.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 𝐼8 844,590 39,637,648 0.4604 0.4410 0.6 2.5 4.1 5.8 7.6 9.3 10.3 12.3 15.4 32.0 𝐼9 900,338 40,714,464 0.4432 0.4432 0.6 2.5 4.0 5.8 7.5 9.2 10.6 12.4 15.4 31.9 𝑇1 221,363 39,093,922 0.5230 0.5041 0.4 2.1 3.5 5.0 6.6 8.3 9.4 11.2 15.0 38.5 𝑇2 164,948 32,077,675 0.6757 0.6553 0.3 0.1 0.4 2.2 4.4 6.6 8.5 11.5 17.0 49.1 𝑇3 12,477 31,458,331 0.5696 0.5311 0.3 0.2 0.2 4.9 7.2 8.9 10.5 12.5 16.3 37.2 𝑇4 4,623 25,838,559 0.5715 0.5334 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 8.4 10.6 11.7 13.9 16.9 34.3 𝑇5 9,196 35,355,034 0.8992 0.5341 1.4 2.7 2.6 3.6 3.9 4.6 10.0 14.6 20.0 36.6 𝑇6 188,107 33,253,367 0.6501 0.6420 0.3 0.2 0.6 2.4 4.6 6.8 8.9 11.7 17.0 47.6 
               
NOTE: the values are in million euros; 𝐺𝑌 stands for the Gini index of the x-th variable; 𝐶𝑋,𝑌 is the concentration index of the x-th variable ranked by non-decreasing value of total gross 
income; the income groups are ordered by non-decreasing values of total gross income excluding individuals with zero income.
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Appendix C 
 
This appendix brings together graphical evidence on the choice of the optimal 
bandwidth (half-bandwidth of kernel) for each simulated scenario. With reference 
to the Figures from 6 to 13, the solid line stands for the optimal bandwidth found 
using [15] (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿), while dash lines refer to the multiple optimal bandwidths 
observed when employing [17] (𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉). Finally, Figure 14 depicts the smoothed 
relationship between net income and gross income in the application of [18] (𝑂𝐵𝑈), 
that is the estimate of post-tax income levels free of horizontal inequity. 
 
Figure 6 – Choosing the optimal bandwidth using [15] (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿) and [17] (𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉) for EX  
  
 
Figure 7 – Choosing the optimal bandwidth using [15] (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿) and [17] (𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉) for CIT 
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Figure 8 – Choosing the optimal bandwidth using [15] (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿) and [17] (𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉) for 
FLAT 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Choosing the optimal bandwidth using [15] (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿) and [17] (𝑂𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑉) for 
NFLAT 
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Figure 10 – Choosing the optimal bandwidth using [15] (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿) for EX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 – Choosing the optimal bandwidth using [15] (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿) for CIT 
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Figure 12 – Choosing the optimal bandwidth using [15] (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿) for FLAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 – Choosing the optimal bandwidth using [15] (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝐶𝐿) for NFLAT 
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Figure 14 – Choosing the optimal half-bandwidth of kernel using [18] (𝑂𝐵𝑈)  
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